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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Items 37 (a) and 105 of the
preliminary list*
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
NECESSITY OF ADOPTING EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WHO ARE VICTIMS OF ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING ARMED CONFLICTS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 26 April 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, information on the effects of the Security Council sanctions on the health situation of the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General assembly, under items 37 (a) and 105 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

Annex

Effects of the Security Council sanctions on the health situation of the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

I. INTRODUCTION

Security Council resolutions 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 and 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993 and the economic and other sanctions established by them against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia affect the entire population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and threaten the survival of 10.5 million of its citizens and over 500,000 refugees who found shelter in its territory.

The social product in 1990 (the last year before the civil war and the commencement of the implementation of sanctions) stood at US$ 26,590 million (by the United Nations methodology), which translated into a per capita income of US$ 2,530. In 1993, it fell to US$ 12,573 million, the per capita income being US$ 1,197. The 1990 level of the social product could be achieved only in the year 2012 provided that the sanctions are lifted immediately.

The imposition of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the field of health was contrary to the best traditions in medicine and constituted a violation of many norms of international humanitarian law. The special resolution of the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted in 1989 explicitly prohibits embargoes on medical supplies on political grounds.

The total blockade of Yugoslavia has affected most painfully and tragically the field of health. Yugoslavia has been denied the right to import medicine and medical equipment and literature, and many norms of international humanitarian law have been violated, including the fundamental right to life and health. The inhuman United Nations policy affected adversely the functioning of the health service in general and an entire people was collectively punished, particularly children and the elderly, who are in need of the best and adequate health care and protection.

II. EFFECTS

Some permanent members of the Security Council that are not signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child cannot be freed from the moral and other responsibility for the increase in infant and child mortality in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, caused by the lack of humanitarian supplies. In the period from 1950 to 1990, infant mortality declined from 118.1 to 23.2 per 1,000 live births in Serbia and from 101.9 to 16.6 in Montenegro and after the imposition of sanctions increased from 21.6 in 1991 to 22.3 in 1992 and from 11.2 in 1991 to 13.2 in 1992 in Serbia and Montenegro respectively.

In addition, there is a recurrence of neonatal tetanus and poliomyelitis after they have been eradicated and the number of deaths per 100 hospitalized

patients has significantly increased. These data indicate that the United Nations sanctions have genocidal effects on the youngest generation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, regardless of their ethnic origin or religious belief.

The sanctions have had an adverse effect primarily on mortality, morbidity and the implementation of some preventive medical measures.

Mortality rate as a result of contagious diseases, excluding acquired immune deficiency syndrome, increased from 191 in 1989 to 271 in 1993, i.e. by 41.8 per cent, as well as infant mortality, caused by other contagious diseases, from 36 in 1989 to 64 in 1993. The number of deaths caused by active tuberculosis has also increased from zero in 1989 to 14 in 1993. The lack of vaccine resulted in an increase of deaths caused by morbilli from 8 in 1989 to 21 in 1993. The situation is similar with regard to venereal diseases (syphilis and gonorrhoea) which are on the increase owing to greater promiscuity and the lack of medicine.

The lack of purifiers needed for water purification, spare parts, equipment and fuels has resulted in the deterioration of the quality of drinking water so that 15,065 cases of dysentery, hepatitis and typhus have been recorded.

As a result of the drastically deteriorated diet of the population - the consumption of milk in the 1988-1992 period fell by 24 per cent, of meat by 23 per cent, vegetables by 36 per cent and fruit by 46 per cent - 15 per cent of families have serious iron deficiency, 41 per cent calcium deficiency and as many as 60 per cent magnesium deficiency, 31 per cent of families have vitamin A deficiency and as many as 85 per cent vitamin B deficiency. This directly affects newborn babies, which can be best illustrated by the situation in the maternity ward in Novi Sad where the average weight of newborn babies at birth has dropped, while particularly alarming is the average head circumference of newborn babies, which is under 35 centimetres.

After 100 weeks of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, their short-term genocidal effects can be also illustrated by the following indicators: in 1992, the mortality rate caused by acute brain-festering diseases was 6 per cent of the total number of patients treated at clinics for infectious diseases, while in 1993 this rate was 16 per cent. The duration of bacterial diseases has been prolonged, e.g. bacterial pneumonia used to be treated in 10 to 15 days while today it is treated for several weeks with the resulting pleurisy and the development of tuberculosis of the lung, because the general conditions in hospitals have deteriorated drastically, meals in them are substandard (below 2,000 calories daily) without meat and milk, hospital pyjamas have not been renewed for two years and hygiene is at the lowest level.

Because of the negative attitude of the United Nations Sanctions Committee towards the import of space parts for diagnostic and therapy equipment and medicine (cytostatics, analgesics, antibiotics), specialists in oncology have found themselves in the worst possible situation in the history of medicine - they have to select whom to treat. So far, the sanctions have caused the premature death of over 60 per cent of patients suffering from malignant diseases, shortened the life of over 55,000 of these patients, thus committing

biological genocide on 150,000 patients in Yugoslavia, while last year alone 2,680 more patients died than in normal conditions.

The grave economic situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia caused by the United Nations sanctions has had a direct effect on the mental health of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who are exposed to stress as a result of the lack of medicine and food. Mortality at psychiatric clinics has been on the increase: the most illustrative example is the psychiatric hospital at Gornja Toponica where, in 1992, 147 patients died, i.e. 201 per cent more than in 1991 while, in the period between January and 18 November 1993, 209 patients died, i.e. 147 per cent more than in the whole of 1992 and 347 per cent more than in the whole of 1991.

The situation in psychiatric hospitals in Kovin, Vršac and Dobrota is the same.

The elderly in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have been affected the most by the deteriorating medical services and home-care conditions. The lack of medicine and equipment for diabetes, dialysis, cardiovascular diseases, etc. has directly caused an increase in mortality among the population over 65 years of age, so that, in the two last years alone, mortality in this age group rose from 5,828.3 (1,000,000) in 1991 to 6,571.7 in 1992, i.e. 13 per cent, while in 1993 there were over 500 suicides, mainly among the elderly. The number of suicides is increasing.

Because of the devastating effects of the United Nations sanctions, which have caused suffering, diseases and death in the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, threatened by biological extermination, in the name of humanity we call on the international community to lift the United Nations sanctions immediately and never to impose them on any other people in the world again.

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LETTER DATED 26 APRIL 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as the Chairman of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in New York, I have the honour to request you to permit Mr. Hamid Algabid, the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to participate, under rule 39 of the rules of procedure, in the Security Council debate being held on Wednesday, 27 April 1994, on "The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
and Chairman of the ICFM in New York

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GENERAL

S/1994/508
27 April 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 APRIL 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a press release issued at the end of consultations on the situation in Rwanda which were held in Arusha on 24 April 1994 at the invitation of the facilitator, H.E. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present press release circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ulli MWAMBULUKUTU
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex

Press release issued on 24 April 1994

1. Even though a formal meeting has not yet taken place, in the course of the last 24 hours, there have been vigorous consultations on how to bring about the cessation of hostilities in Rwanda.

2. These consultations which have involved the Prime Minister and First Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Hon. John S. Malacela, MP., on behalf of the facilitator and the Secretary-General of the OAU, H.E. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, have involved meeting extensively with the Secretary-General of Rwandese Patriotic Front both at individual and at trilateral level.

3. It has also involved extensive consultations with the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, H.E. Dr. Booh Booh with his team which included the Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Brigadier General Henry K. Anyidoho.

4. In the course of these consultations, specific proposals were made on how to bring about and to ensure the maintenance of a cease-fire as well as the next course of action in the context of moving forward towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

5. To this end, the issue of convening, as soon as possible, a meeting to discuss the immediate implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and other related issues was seriously considered.

6. The consultations have so far been very useful and underscored the positive disposition of all involved for an early end to the massacres and the achievement of a cease-fire.

7. The consultations will continue with the representatives of the Rwandese Government as soon as they arrive in Arusha.

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27 April 1994
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 27 APRIL 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi national airspace committed by United States aircraft in order to carry out reconnaissance, cause provocation and drop heat flares have continued over the period 11 to 20 April 1994.

11 April 1994

(a) Northern region: 29 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Shaqlawah, Aqrah, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 52 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Qal'at Salih, Chabaish, Qurnah, Busayyah and Jalibah.

12 April 1994

(a) Northern region: 35 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 32 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Busayyah, Jalibah, Qal'at Salih and Artawi.

At 1230 hours on 12 April 1994, aggressor aircraft dropped two heat flares over the Ba'shiqah area in the Ninawa Governorate.

13 April 1994

(a) Northern region: 17 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 54 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

At 1150 hours on 13 April 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Basra, Qurnah, Samawah, Shatrah, Amarah, and Chabaish. It left at 1435 hours in the direction of Saudi airspace.

14 April 1994

(a) Northern region: 34 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Sinjar, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 51 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Qurnah, Amarah, Artawi, Qal'at Salih, Shatrah, Jalibah and Busayyah.

15 April 1994

Southern region: 12 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Chabaish, Lasaf and Busayyah.

At 1651 hours on 15 April 1994, a hostile formation broke the sound barrier over the Khidr area.

16 April 1994

Southern region: 36 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah, Artawi and Qal'at Salih.

17 April 1994

Southern region: 36 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qurnah, Suq al-Shuyukh, Artawi, Jalibah and Busayyah.

18 April 1994

(a) Northern region: 25 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 46 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah, Busayyah and Artawi.

At 1751 hours on 18 April 1994, a hostile formation broke the sound barrier over the Jalibah area.

19 April 1994

Southern region: 66 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shanafiyah, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

20 April 1994

(a) Northern region: 31 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Zakho and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 67 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Artawi, Jalibah and Busayyah.

At 0709 hours on 20 April 1994, a hostile two-aircraft formation broke the sound barrier over the city of Nasiriyah.

At 0917 hours on 20 April 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over the area to the west of Basra. It left at 1230 hours in the direction of Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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27 April 1994

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LETTER DATED 27 APRIL 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement dated 25 April 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning anti-Yugoslav activities pursued by Albania.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expresses its concern at the repeated provocations of border incidents and the escalation of the anti-Yugoslav campaign by Albania, which is a continued expression of its territorial claims against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The unfounded attacks on Yugoslavia, joined by the Permanent Mission of Albania to the United Nations, have been motivated by the demonstrations of Albanian separatists in New York, the deterioration of the Albanian-Greek relations and the latest incident on the Yugoslav-Albanian border provoked by Albania. In order to conceal its own responsibility for the deterioration of relations with its neighbours, the Albanian Government, short of any arguments, has once again resorted to the well-known method of fabricating accusations against Yugoslavia. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects as unfounded the accusations presented in the statements and communiqués of the representatives of the Albanian Government circulated in the United Nations.

On 15 April 1994, the Permanent Mission of Albania to the United Nations distributed a statement on anti-Yugoslav demonstrations of Albanian separatists in New York. In doing so, Albania once again openly supported in the world Organization's Headquarters the demands of Albanian separatists for the creation of the so-called independent "republic of Kosovo". In this way, Albania manifested its territorial claims against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the eyes of the entire world public. Albania misuses the functioning of its Mission to the United Nations for the violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations of respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

In the letter by Albanian Foreign Minister A. Serequi of 11 April addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/416) and in the Declaration of the Albanian Government of 13 April on the deterioration of the Albanian-Greek relations following the incident on the Albanian-Greek border, Albania vehemently and without any reason attacked Yugoslavia and accused Greece, Chairman of the European Union, for its positions on the Yugoslav crisis. This is not the first time that Albania has levelled unscrupulous accusations against Yugoslavia, the Serbian leadership and its other neighbours in its attempts to conceal its own responsibility before the Albanian and international public for its dangerous policy, which is the main source of instability in the region.

The incident on the Yugoslav-Albanian border of 15 April was used by the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to level new accusations against Yugoslavia in its statement of 18 April. This time, Albania accused Yugoslavia and Greece of provoking coordinated border incidents, which Yugoslavia rejects as unfounded and malicious. All the responsibility for the 15 April incident is borne by the Albanian side, which has provoked incidents on the Yugoslav-Albanian border on a continuous basis and over a protracted period of time. Two Albanian citizens, crossing the State border illegally, were killed, as admitted also by Albania, 150 metres deep in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as they ignored the warning of the Yugoslav border guards to stop. The Federal Ministry

of Foreign Affairs reiterates that all the responsibility is borne by the Albanian side, which continues to violate the generally accepted norms of respect for inter-State borders.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deplores that, instead of improving its relations with its neighbours and consolidating them gradually, the Albanian Government has determined to continue to exacerbate them.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia calls on the Government of Albania once again to end its anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian propaganda and the policy of confrontation and to accept the policy of good-neighbourliness and cooperation, to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is genuinely committed.

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S/1994/511
28 April 1994

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 882 (1993) of 5 November 1993, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) for a period of six months. It is also submitted in response to Security Council resolution 898 (1994) of 23 February 1994, by which, in particular, the Council requested me to report on whether the Government of Mozambique and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) had made tangible progress in a timely manner towards implementing the provisions of the general peace agreement for Mozambique signed on 4 October 1992 (S/24635). In the latter resolution, the Council further requested me to begin preparing proposals for the drawdown of an appropriate number of military personnel, to prepare a timetable for the completion of ONUMOZ's mandate and to ensure maximum economy in the operation of ONUMOZ, while remaining mindful of the importance of the effective discharge of its mandate.

II. POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS

A. General

2. A number of important developments have taken place since my last report to the Council on 28 January 1994 (S/1994/89). With the beginning of demobilization on 10 March 1994, the peace process entered into another critical phase. Fifty-five per cent of government and 81 per cent of RENAMO soldiers have now been cantoned and actual demobilization has begun. The training programme for the new Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM), inaugurated in March 1994, has so far provided training for some 2,000 soldiers. The leaders of FADM, Generals Lagos Lidimo of the Government and Mateus Ngonhamo of RENAMO, were sworn into office on 6 April 1994 as joint high commanders of the new army.

3. On 11 April, the President of Mozambique, Mr. Joaquim Chissano, announced that the general elections would take place on 27 and 28 October 1994. The National Elections Commission had been inaugurated in February 1994, and its

10 provincial offices were established by the end of March. On 1 March 1994, 30 RENAMO officials signed contracts with the Government to work as advisers to the 10 provincial governors. This arrangement, which was agreed upon by President Chissano and Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, President of RENAMO, during their first meeting in Mozambique in 1993, is one of the key steps in implementing administrative and territorial integration. The advisers will, in particular, facilitate government access to areas formerly controlled by RENAMO that lack basic administrative structures.

4. During the reporting period, President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama continued to meet regularly. These contacts have contributed greatly to progress in the implementation of the Rome agreement. However, in spite of these positive developments, there still are serious problems that must be urgently addressed and resolved: the slow cantonment of government troops and delays in the demobilization of RENAMO troops, as well as in the formation and training of the new army.

B. Assembly and demobilization of troops

5. My last report to the Council indicated that the cantonment of troops had started as scheduled on 30 November 1993. However, the opening of 14 assembly areas was delayed by a dispute between the two parties over control of the locations proposed for assembly areas at Salamanga and Dunda. My Special Representative, Mr. Aldo Ajello, held a series of negotiations that eventually resolved the problem; the total planned number of 49 assembly areas were open and operational by 21 February 1994. Initially, the Government assembled a greater proportion of its soldiers than RENAMO; however, the situation has now been reversed, with RENAMO assembling a proportionally much larger number of soldiers than the Government. As of 18 April 1994, a total of 49,465 soldiers had reported to the assembly areas, 34,012 from the Government and 15,453 from RENAMO. This represents 55 per cent of the soldiers declared by the Government and 81 per cent of those declared by RENAMO.

6. There has been no major increase recently in the movement by the Government of its soldiers to assembly areas. Some of the areas are overcrowded, while others are virtually empty: capacity utilization ranges from a low of 3 per cent to a high of almost 420 per cent. The overcrowding has made the supply of basic goods to these areas an extremely difficult task, which has been aggravated by the lack of adequate air resources. Nevertheless, ONUMOZ has been able to achieve a generally satisfactory level of logistic support to all areas.

7. Because of the delays in demobilization, soldiers have had to remain in the assembly areas for considerably longer periods than originally foreseen. In some of the assembly areas, this situation caused serious tensions among the troops, resulting in 20 violent protests since January 1994. In many instances, government soldiers have not received their pay and, consequently, have refused to be demobilized until arrears due to them are paid. In RENAMO areas, unrealistic promises concerning possible benefits for ex-soldiers were made by commanders. As a result, the present reintegration package does not meet the expectations of some RENAMO soldiers, who have refused to be demobilized. In

all cases, ONUMOZ has been working closely with the parties to find solutions and to defuse tensions.

8. Demobilization finally began on 10 March 1994. As of 18 April 1994, a total of 12,756 troops (12,195 government and 561 RENAMO) had been demobilized and transported to the districts of their choice. This corresponds to 20 per cent of government and 3 per cent of RENAMO soldiers expected to check into the assembly areas. On the day of departure from the assembly area, each soldier receives civilian clothing, a demobilization card, a cash sum equivalent to three months' pay and a voucher for an additional three-month subsidy to be paid in the district of residence. As provided for in the reintegration support scheme, each demobilized soldier also receives a reintegration support checkbook providing for an additional 18 months of financial support in the district where he intends to settle. Furthermore, the soldiers receive transport subsidies, rations for two weeks, and packages containing seeds and agricultural tools. Transport is provided for the demobilized, their primary dependants and the soldiers' personal belongings to the district of choice.

9. Although, from a technical point of view, demobilization is proceeding smoothly, the process has been marked by substantial delays. According to the revised timetable, the parties committed themselves to initiate demobilization in January 1994; the process, however, started only in March and has recently slowed down. In addition, the assembly of remaining troops is now at a near standstill. Unless this trend is reversed, further delays in demobilization will be inevitable. The leaders of both parties are aware of this serious problem. On 8 April 1994, President Chissano met with Mr. Dhlakama and they agreed that the Government would expedite the assembly of its troops and that RENAMO would accelerate the pace of its demobilization.

10. In the meantime, the two parties also agreed that, in addition to moving soldiers into assembly areas for demobilization, a certain number of military personnel would, for practical reasons, remain in their present locations and be demobilized <u>in situ</u>. Such locations would include military hospitals, air bases, naval bases and both government and RENAMO military headquarters, for a total of approximately 70 locations. It is estimated that some 17,000 soldiers, including some 4,830 disabled, have to be discharged in this manner. In addition, all military equipment will have to be registered in these sites, with light weapons being immediately transported to regional arms depots. It is planned that heavy equipment will be disabled and remain under the joint custody of a local commander and a United Nations Regional Commander.

11. As of 18 April 1994, 35,536 weapons belonging to government troops and 13,210 belonging to RENAMO troops had been handed over to ONUMOZ military observers. The transfer of weapons from assembly areas to regional arms depots, which had been an issue of major controversy, finally began on 15 March 1994 and is now being carried out on a regular basis. Delays have also accumulated in the disbanding of the 155,600 militia and paramilitary forces. This is due in part to the fact that these forces are scattered throughout the country, with armed elements in virtually all villages. The disbanding is performed by the Government. Verification of the lists of personnel released from duty with paramilitary forces and the collection of surrendered weapons are being done by teams of the Cease-fire Commission. Irregularities in this process that are

brought to the attention of the Cease-Fire Commission are immediately investigated. Despite this simplified monitoring method, the implementation of the disbanding of militias has been a logistically complex and demanding task. This was further aggravated by the depletion of ONUMOZ air resources, which brought the process to a standstill at the beginning of March 1994. As of the end of April 1994, 49.5 per cent of the weapons that the Government declared had been assigned to its paramilitary forces had been collected and were in United Nations custody.

C. Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force

12. There has been substantial progress in the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force since I last reported to the Council. The formation of the new army is the responsibility of the Government and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. Although the general peace agreement did not envisage any role for the United Nations in this aspect of the peace process, the Mozambican parties requested the United Nations to assume chairmanship of the Joint Commission in order to facilitate its functioning; however, the United Nations is not responsible for training or for providing equipment to the new Defence Force. At the same time, the significance of this project for the overall implementation of the peace process cannot be overestimated. In order to facilitate this process, ONUMOZ agreed to provide logistic and transport support for the creation of the new army at no additional cost to the Mission. Voluntary contributions have also been obtained for the rehabilitation of FADM training centres. However, despite all the efforts made by the United Nations, the training process is moving at a slow pace.

13. According to the general peace agreement, FADM would comprise 30,000 troops, 50 per cent of whom should be provided by the Government and 50 per cent by RENAMO. The parties chose France, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to assist in the training of the new army, and these three countries formulated appropriate programmes in a timely manner. The initial stages of the implementation of these programmes were described in paragraphs 21 and 22 of my last report to the Council (S/1994/89). From the very outset, the programmes have suffered from a lack of financial and other resources. Furthermore, the training programmes as they now stand are designed to train a maximum of 15,000 FADM members before the elections take place. However, President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama have recently agreed that the elections may take place even if training of all soldiers for the new army has not been completed. This is conditional upon the official formation of the full 30,000-strong army and the commencement of all required training courses before the October elections.

14. In order to find a solution to this difficulty, two options are being considered:

(a) To reduce the number of soldiers to be trained prior to the elections to the 15,000 covered by existing training programmes. Under this option, the formation and training of the remaining units would be completed only after the elections. RENAMO is favourably inclined to this formula, but the Government so far has been reluctant to consider it;

(b) To retain the number of soldiers to be trained, as planned in the general peace agreement, at the level of 30,000. To make this option viable, it is necessary that additional countries provide assistance to the programme and contribute sufficient human and financial resources to train, by the end of October, 15,000 military personnel who at present have not been designated to receive training. This option seems to be acceptable to both parties.

15. A quick solution to this problem is essential, not only for the timely formation of the new army, but also for the completion of the demobilization process. If the new army is not entirely formed and placed in training centres, a large number of soldiers will linger in assembly areas. This would prevent these areas from being closed, with serious financial and, in all likelihood, security consequences. A further complication is that the Government has been slow in providing logistical and technical support to the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force as well as to the new army itself.

D. Cease-fire

16. During the reporting period, there have been no military activities in Mozambique that posed a serious threat to the cease-fire or to the peace process as a whole. However, the Cease-fire Commission received 12 written complaints of alleged cease-fire violations, 8 from RENAMO and 4 from the Government. The complaints fell into two categories: unauthorized presence or misconduct of troops and militia and intimidating or aggressive behaviour by soldiers. Ten complaints were solved and are considered closed, while two cases are still under investigation.

17. An issue of some concern, however, is the verification of military equipment, particularly heavy equipment, which remains in various military installations. Neither the Government nor RENAMO has so far allowed the United Nations to reconnoitre certain military bases, nor have they provided ONUMOZ with complete lists of military equipment. Government authorities have recently announced that an investigation has been launched concerning an unconfirmed report of the emergence in Zambezia Province of an armed faction that is allegedly advocating the secession of the four northern provinces from Mozambique. Earlier this year, the Government accused a splinter group from Malawi of invading the same area. The Mozambican Government has entered into bilateral discussions with the Government of Malawi for the purpose of ensuring that the border is respected. ONUMOZ is closely monitoring the situation.

E. Status of and reductions in the military component of ONUMOZ

18. As of 18 April 1994, against an authorized strength of 6,979, the military component, composed of military observers, staff officers and formed units, totalled 5,914 all ranks (see annex).

19. The United Nations forces continued to carry out operational activities throughout the country, including the maintenance of security in the corridors and along highways and main roads by conducting regular road and aerial patrols

as well as by providing train escorts. Furthermore, United Nations troops have provided security to airports, regional depots for weapons collected from both parties, oil-pumping stations, food storage locations and other United Nations installations. ONUMOZ has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to the Mozambican population to the extent possible. Its engineer units assisted in rehabilitating training centres for FADM, as well as in clearing and repairing damage caused by tropical cyclone "Nadia", which struck the northern coast of Mozambique on 24 March 1994.

20. Three hundred and seventy military observers from 19 countries were deployed with ONUMOZ; 292 of them were based in the 49 assembly areas where they have been supervising the cantonment of troops, their disarmament and subsequent demobilization or transfer to the new army. The military observers are also carrying out the important task of monitoring the cease-fire by conducting inspections and investigations into alleged violations. In addition, the military observers are monitoring the disbanding of paramilitary forces throughout the country. The military observers have gained considerable knowledge of the Mozambican peace process, which in turn enables them to contribute to the efforts to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement at the local level as well as in the Cease-fire Commission.

21. It was originally planned to begin a gradual reduction of military observers in June 1994. However, it is now clear that demobilization will not be completed by that time. In addition, the military observers will be called upon to perform essential post-demobilization tasks beyond that date including monitoring and verifying the cease-fire until the newly elected Government takes over, the disposal of collected weapons and ammunition and other verification functions related to the peace process. In these circumstances, I am not in a position to recommend a reduction in the strength of this important element of ONUMOZ at the present stage.

22. In pursuance of the specific requests made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Security Council resolution 898 (1994) of 23 February 1994, I am making every effort to ensure that the deployment of the civilian police component of ONUMOZ (CIVPOL) will not entail an overall increase in the costs of the Mission, without prejudice to the effective discharge of its mandate. The requested drawdown of the United Nations forces is therefore planned to be implemented as follows:

(a) In accordance with the decision of the Government of Italy, the Italian contingent will be reduced by approximately 800 troops during the month of April 1994. This reduction is already under way. However, the Italian Government has agreed to the retention of the field hospital, a limited logistics element and the necessary security personnel, totalling approximately 200;

(b) A number of ONUMOZ support elements will also be withdrawn or reduced according to their previously scheduled rotation:

	Reduction From	To	Month
Indian engineer company	233	0	May
Indian logistic company	206	0	May
Indian independent engineer company	257	0	July
Indian independent HQ company a/	257	61	May
Bangladesh engineer company b/	250	50	May
Bangladesh movement control unit	24	10	May
Portuguese signals battalion	278	150	May

a/ 41 military police and 20 clerks will be retained.

b/ Some 50 specialists in ordnance disposal will be retained and integrated into the Bangladesh infantry battalion.

23. The drastic reduction of the support units will be partially compensated by the troops' integral logistics systems and some additional civilian support. I would like to pay tribute to the troops who will be leaving the Mission area soon. They have performed admirably under challenging circumstances in Mozambique and have made an important contribution to the difficult task of bringing the peace process forward.

24. As a consequence of this planned reduction, it is intended that the remaining formed units be redeployed as follows:

(a) Two Botswana infantry companies will remain in the Tete corridor;

(b) Two Botswana companies, and possibly the Botswana contingent headquarters, will be redeployed to Chimoio in the Beira corridor;

(c) One Bangladesh company will be moved from Nampula to the Beira corridor. From within that company, one platoon will be stationed in Quelimane (Zambezia Province) to replace a platoon from Botswana.

25. I very much hope that the reduction of support units will not have a negative impact on daily operations. However, the drawdown in the infantry unit is a cause of concern. Neighbouring countries, to which these corridors are of vital importance as major import/export routes, have already expressed their strong preoccupation about security in them. This concern may be justified, as the reduction of United Nations forces coincides with demobilization of government and RENAMO troops, which in turn is expected to result in an increase in banditry along the main routes. To maintain an adequate level of security, it might be necessary, while reducing the strength of the logistic element, to deploy an additional infantry company to the Beira corridor, and I am approaching potential troop contributors in this regard. Under the circumstances, I do not recommend any further reduction of the military component of ONUMOZ before the elections.

III. PREPARATION FOR THE ELECTIONS

26. In paragraph 12 of resolution 898 (1994), the Security Council once again reaffirmed the vital importance it attaches to the holding of elections no later than October 1994. As already mentioned, the dates of the elections have now been set for 27 and 28 October 1994.

27. In paragraph 14 of my previous report (S/1994/89), I informed the Council that the Electoral Law, which was approved by the Mozambican National Assembly on 9 December 1993 and promulgated by President Chissano shortly thereafter, entered into force on 12 January 1994, and that the members of the National Elections Commission were then in the process of selecting a chairperson. On 2 February 1994, they unanimously nominated Mr. Brazão Mazula, who is not associated with any political party, as the Chairman of the National Elections Commission. The Commission officially started functioning on 15 February 1994. It has held a series of working meetings, completed its staffing, established provincial offices and drafted its standing rules of procedure and it is presently opening district offices throughout the country. It has also approved the following timetable for the electoral process:

15 February-31 May:	Selection, briefing and training of registration brigades, preparatory activities for the registration process
1 June-15 August:	Voter registration
16 August-9 September:	Receipt and consideration of claims relating to registration, revision of the electoral rolls and preparations for the electoral campaign
10 September-24 October:	Electoral campaign
27 and 28 October:	Polling

28. The Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration, which is to provide technical support to the National Elections Commission pursuant to the Electoral Law, initiated its activities on 11 February 1994, albeit without a proper legal framework. The government decree that officially established the Technical Secretariat was promulgated on 13 April 1994. As a result, the Technical Secretariat, which is responsible for voter registration, has not yet been able to establish its presence at the provincial and district levels.

29. The Electoral Law provides for the establishment of an Electoral Tribunal to be composed of two national and three international judges, the latter to be appointed by me after receiving nominations from the Security Council. After due consideration of the candidates presented by the Council, I have decided to appoint Michel Coat (France), Mariano Fiallos Oyanguren (Nicaragua) and Joao Moreira Camilo (Portugal) as international members and Walter Ramos da Costa Porto (Brazil) and Juan Ignacio García Rodriguez (Chile) as alternate international members of the Mozambique Electoral Tribunal. I have also written to President Chissano apprising him of these appointments.

30. Resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992 encouraged United Nations programmes and specialized agencies to provide appropriate assistance and support for the implementation of the major tasks arising from the general peace agreement, which would obviously include the preparation of elections. The United Nations is playing a major coordinating role for technical assistance to the entire electoral process in Mozambique. A technical assistance trust fund has been established for this purpose. The financial requirements for the electoral process have been revised down from an original US$ 71 million to US$ 59 million, of which US$ 47 million have already been pledged by the international community. I appeal to donors to bridge the gap of US$ 12 million, as well as to fulfil existing commitments in order to allow the crucial task of voter registration to proceed as scheduled.

31. In May 1993, a trust fund for the implementation of the peace process in Mozambique was established to facilitate the integration of RENAMO in the structures set forth in the peace agreement. The resources provided through this trust fund have assisted the establishment of RENAMO's presence in major cities and its transformation into a political party. However, in addition to the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and RENAMO, 12 other political parties have registered to participate in the elections. Given the fact that these parties have very limited resources available to them, it has been deemed necessary to establish a special trust fund for assistance to registered political parties in Mozambique to enable them to carry out electoral activities. This Trust Fund has now been established, and I appeal to the donor community to contribute to this important mechanism to ensure the active participation of all eligible parties in the first multiparty elections in Mozambique.

IV. POLICE ACTIVITIES

32. As members of the Security Council will recall, on 3 September 1993 President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama agreed to request the United Nations to monitor all police activities in the country, including those of the Mozambican Police, to monitor the rights and liberties of Mozambican citizens and to provide technical support to the National Police Affairs Commission created under the general peace agreement. The police component of ONUMOZ, which was established by Security Council resolution 898 (1994) of 23 February, is also mandated to monitor and verify the process of reorganizing and retraining the Quick Reaction Police, to monitor (together with other ONUMOZ components) the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and to perform other functions as described in my report on this matter (S/1994/89/Add.1).

33. I am pleased to report that, as of 18 April 1994, 278 United Nations police observers had already arrived in Mozambique and had been deployed throughout the country. Eighty-seven CIVPOL posts have been identified outside the provincial capitals, which will cover 208 Mozambican Police stations and posts. As basic facilities such as accommodation, water and electricity are not available in most of these remote locations, tentage and other necessities had to be obtained to allow these United Nations posts to be fully operational as early as possible. At present, 10 such CIVPOL outposts have been established. Visits to police stations and mobile patrols are regularly carried out to hold discussions

with the Mozambican Police, to meet the general public and to gather information about police activities, as well as to represent ONUMOZ in the remotest parts of the country.

34. The beneficial confidence-building effect of an increasing CIVPOL deployment is already obvious. The component is maintaining close liaison with the Ministry of the Interior, the Mozambican Police Command, provincial governors and their RENAMO advisers, as well as with other RENAMO representatives, on all police-related matters. However, notwithstanding the agreement of the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO that an enlarged presence of CIVPOL would enhance the peace process, CIVPOL initially faced a number of difficulties in carrying out its mandate, especially as regards access to information and visits to police stations and prisons. In February 1994, a seminar was held with the participation of CIVPOL, the Police Affairs Commission and the Mozambican Police, during which problems of cooperation were discussed and a modus operandi was agreed upon. The situation improved following the seminar, particularly at the provincial level, where lack of information about the tasks of CIVPOL seems to have been one of the obstacles.

35. In addition, some difficulties were initially encountered in gaining access to the Quick Reaction Force, a Special Forces Branch of the Mozambican Police. As part of the overall reintegration of RENAMO and government-controlled areas, it is foreseen that the Mozambican Police will establish police posts in areas controlled by RENAMO. Despite indications from the Mozambican Police that it would seek CIVPOL's assistance in this field, its members refused on several occasions to accompany CIVPOL to those locations. In order for CIVPOL to exercise its mandate properly, it is important that it enjoy the full cooperation of the parties. In the relatively short period during which CIVPOL has performed its monitoring functions, it has observed a number of violations of rights and civil liberties. To date, it has investigated 36 cases of misconduct by members of the national police. These cases have subsequently been communicated to the Police Affairs Commission and to the Mozambican Police command for remedial action, where necessary.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

36. The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) of ONUMOZ continues to coordinate assistance to internally displaced persons, returnees and ex-soldiers, focusing on their resettlement and full reintegration into Mozambican society. In connection with this priority concern, particular attention is being paid to the implementation of the requisite projects within the social sector, especially in the areas of health, education, water and transport.

37. A reintegration support scheme for demobilizing soldiers has now been added to the overall reintegration programme developed to facilitate re-entry of the demobilized into civilian society. The scheme extends the Government's 6 months' severance payments to ex-soldiers for a further 18 months. A total of US$ 18.1 million has been pledged to this United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-administered fund by donors who are convinced that a longer reintegration period for the ex-soldiers is prudent. The vocational training programme for

demobilized soldiers, along with the distribution of corresponding kits, is expected to begin in June under the auspices of the International Labour Organization (ILO). A job referral and counselling service is being implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

38. The United Nations mine-clearance programme has suffered significant delays, partially as a result of the slow approval of the national mine-clearance plan by the Cease-fire Commission, but also because the process of identifying and selecting suitable contractors turned out to be protracted. Negotiations have finally been completed for a contract for the clearance of unexploded ordnance and mines blocking 2,000 kilometres of priority roads.

39. Under United Nations auspices, an important road is being cleared near the Malawian border in Zambezia Province, a main route for tens of thousands of returning refugees. The mine clearance personnel involved have been trained in a project financed by the United Kingdom, which has produced 71 mine clearers so far. Another key road is being cleared in Tete Province and a further 278 mine clearers trained with joint funding from the United Nations and the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD). Through funding made available by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and with technical assistance from the United Nations, a further project has trained a first group of 80 mine clearers and 9 dog handlers. They began work in mid-April on a road along the Zambezi River crucial for the return of refugees. The mining of this road leading to Mutarara district, at the juncture of four provinces south of Malawi, had created the country's worst bottleneck for population movements.

40. The United Nations Mine-clearance Training Centre, operating from temporary facilities, commenced its first course for 30 mine-clearance personnel on 4 April 1994. The nationwide survey of mines is also now well on its way, producing detailed information on mined areas and roads.

41. To date, 75 per cent of the 4 million persons who were internally displaced at the time of the signature of the general peace agreement in October 1992 have now resettled in rural areas, leaving an estimated 1 million still displaced as of April 1994. One half of the 1.6 million refugees in neighbouring countries at the time of the peace accord have also now returned to Mozambique, with the remaining 800,000 largely expected to return before the planting season in September/October 1994. The organized repatriation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of refugees from South Africa commenced in April and a similar programme for the repatriation of Mozambican refugees from the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia is scheduled for June and July 1994. Free food distribution is being progressively discontinued in asylum countries and moved to returnees' destinations in Mozambique, to ensure that their move is towards food security and not away from it.

42. Cyclone "Nadia" struck Nampula Province in northern Mozambique on 24 March 1994. The disaster came soon after the recent resettlement of many of the province's internally displaced. Many schools, health posts and roads - already woefully inadequate - were demolished. In the first days following this calamity, UNOHAC, acting under the auspices of the United Nations Emergency Coordinator, organized airlifts of 200 tons of emergency relief supplies

provided from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and government stockpiles and contributions made by bilateral donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

43. The outlook for the coming harvest is only fair as a result of inadequate rainfall in a number of areas and also to the cyclone that destroyed many crops in Nampula Province. These indications point to a probable mix of marketable surpluses and significant food shortages, with redistribution from surplus to deficit areas made difficult by poor marketing networks. A Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/World Food Programme (WFP) mission is at present undertaking an assessment of crops and food import needs for the 1994/95 crop year. As part of its continuing food assistance and delivery programme, WFP, together with the European Union and other donors, is purchasing maize in surplus areas for use in relief activities.

44. A total of US$ 50.2 million has been pledged to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP trust funds for humanitarian assistance to Mozambique, of which US$ 31 million has been received. Of this amount, $23.8 million has been obligated or disbursed to projects targeting resettling displaced persons, returning refugees and demobilizing soldiers, often through area-based initiatives of benefit to all three groups.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

45. By its resolution 48/250 of 24 March 1994, the General Assembly, inter alia, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for ONUMOZ at a rate not to exceed $26,900,000 gross per month for a period of up to three months beginning 1 May 1994, subject to the decision to be taken by the Security Council in respect of the Operation. This commitment authority is based on the cost estimates for the maintenance of ONUMOZ for the period from 1 May 1994 to 31 October 1994 contained in the Secretary-General's report of 17 January 1994 (A/48/849). In an effort to ensure maximum efficiency and economy, the costs associated with the establishment by the police contingent of ONUMOZ are being met through review of all requirements of the Mission, including those concerning its military component, so as to result in no increase in the cost estimates without prejudice to the effective discharge of the Mission's mandate. I therefore intend to submit to the General Assembly revised cost estimates for the period from 1 May 1994 to 31 October 1994 within the above-mentioned parameters.

46. As of 20 April 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the ONUMOZ special account amounted to some $125.6 million for the period from the inception of ONUMOZ up to 30 April 1994. This represents approximately 38 per cent of the total amount assessed on Member States for the Operation.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

47. During the reporting period, a number of important advances were made in the implementation of the peace process in Mozambique. At the same time, some

urgent and serious difficulties have continued to hinder the timely completion of the process.

48. The announcement on 11 April 1994 by President Chissano that the general elections will be held on 27 and 28 October 1994 was a significant step forward in the implementation of the peace process. It also signified the intention of the Mozambican parties to adhere to the time-frame set by the Security Council for the completion of the process, and a realization that the international community would not be willing to prolong the process unduly.

49. The political will of the parties, while appreciated, is unfortunately not always translated into the practical steps that must be accomplished to ensure the implementation of the peace process, leading to free and fair elections. Especially worrying are the delays in the assembly of government troops, the demobilization of RENAMO troops and the training of the new armed forces of the country. In addition, the National Elections Commission might face practical difficulties in the very complex process of registration of voters, particularly if it is decided to include Mozambicans living abroad.

50. The commitment of the National Elections Commission to hold the elections in October 1994 was reaffirmed to my Special Adviser, Mr. Ismat Kittani, during his visit to Mozambique in early April 1994. Mr. Kittani held discussions with President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama and members of other political parties, as well as a number of ministers and political leaders in the country. While commitments were made to accelerate the process, actual progress has not yet met expectations. A number of problems persist in the areas of logistics, finance the identification of party representatives and free access to all districts of Mozambique.

51. Despite these concerns, I have no doubt that free and fair elections are possible, subject to a few minimal conditions. These include free access by the National Elections Commission and its subsidiary bodies to all areas in the country; the widest possible participation of political parties at all levels of the electoral process; free access to State mass media; full logistical support by the Government and the donor community to the electoral process at the provincial and district levels; and, a total and unconditional commitment by all parties to accept the results of the elections, once declared by the National Elections Commission as having been generally free and fair and so confirmed by the United Nations.

52. Considerable progress has been made in resettling internally displaced persons and Mozambican refugees returning from neighbouring countries. The United Nations, in collaboration with other organizations concerned and bilateral donors, will pursue ongoing programmes to assist the remaining 1 million internally displaced persons and 800,000 refugees to be resettled. The mine-clearance programme will be accelerated to ensure that sufficient progress is made in the coming months in the movement of internally displaced persons and returnees and to facilitate the election campaign. The training of mine-clearance personnel, being undertaken by the United Nations and other donor agencies, will be speeded up so that an adequate number of Mozambicans will have been trained to carry out the necessary mine-clearance activities.

53. Continued assistance for these schemes and for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into civil society is a crucial element in the overall efforts to achieve long-lasting peace in Mozambique. I wish to express my appreciation for the generous support being provided to the humanitarian programmes by many donors and for the commendable work being undertaken in the country by various agencies and organizations.

54. Despite all the challenging tasks that lie ahead, I believe that the major political conditions for the timely completion of this Mission are in place. Meanwhile, ONUMOZ continues to play a vital role in the peace process, which is of increasing importance as the elections draw nearer. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it extend the existing mandate of ONUMOZ at a reduced strength as described in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above until 31 October 1994.

55. I also propose that all military, police and most of the support personnel of the Mission should begin repatriation immediately after the expiration of the mandate. I estimate that this will take up to seven weeks. Subsequently, it is expected that liquidation of the Mission, including the disposal of assets, redeployment of equipment and repatriation of essential administrative staff, will be completed by 31 January 1995. I intend to submit a detailed time-table for the closing down of the Mission in my next report to the Council at the end of July 1994.

56. The peace process in Mozambique has made substantial progress. This was achieved because the parties have resolved to sustain the process and because of the interest and support of the international community. On my part, I am determined to continue my efforts to accelerate the process of implementation and to facilitate the efforts of the Mozambican people to bring it to a final success.

57. I would like to pay tribute to the dedication and professionalism of the staff of ONUMOZ, in particular to my Special Representative, in carrying out the challenging tasks entrusted to them.

Annex

Military and Civilian Personnel

(as at April 1994)

Country	Troops	Headquarters staff	Military observers	Civilian police
Argentina	36	4	8	
Australia				16
Bangladesh	1 371	52	30	25
Botswana	736	25	13	
Brazil			27	35
Canada			15	
Cape Verde			18	
China			10	
Czech Republic			19	
Egypt			20	21
Finland				5
Guinea-Bissau			43	25
Hungary			23	10
India	894	20	18	
Italy	953	19		
Ireland				20
Japan	48	5		
Jordan				45
Malaysia			24	35
Netherlands		11		
New Zealand		2		
Norway				9
Portugal	274	3	1	7
Russian Federation			19	
Spain			20	14
Sweden			20	10
Switzerland				1
Uruguay	813	28	34	
United States of America		5		
Zambia	843	22	8	

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE BETWEEN CHAD AND THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Since 1973, Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya have been disputing the area between them commonly known as the Aouzou Strip.

2. Following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 3 October 1988, both States proclaimed their willingness to resolve the dispute over the Aouzou Strip by peaceful means and in accordance with the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). On 31 August 1989, the two Governments signed, in Algiers, the Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1/ by which, inter alia, the two parties undertook to settle their territorial dispute by all political means, including conciliation, within a period of approximately one year, unless their Heads of State decided otherwise. In the absence of a political settlement of the dispute, the two parties further undertook to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). After several rounds of inconclusive talks between senior officials of the two Governments, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad respectively referred the dispute to ICJ in September 1990.

II. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND AGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES REGARDING ITS IMPLEMENTATION

3. On 3 February 1994, ICJ delivered its Judgment on the territorial dispute between the two countries. It found that the boundary between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was defined by the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness concluded on 10 August 1955 between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Libya. 2/ ICJ also found that the course of that boundary was as follows:

"From the point of intersection of the 24th meridian east with the parallel 19°30' of latitude north, a straight line to the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th meridian east; and from that point a straight line to the point of intersection of the 15th meridian east and the parallel 23° of latitude north."

4. In letters dated 9 March 1994 and 23 March 1994 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/296 and S/1994/332) following the ICJ Judgment, the Governments of the two countries pledged to abide by the Judgment and noted that it had brought a definite solution to the territorial dispute. After several rounds of talks between high-level delegations from Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, an agreement was signed on 4 April 1994 at Surt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, establishing the practical modalities for the implementation of the ICJ Judgment. The agreement provides, inter alia, for the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces (art. 1), removal of mines (art. 2), crossing points for persons and property (art. 3), study of the question of monitoring the frontier (art. 4), maintenance of good-neighbourliness (art. 5), demarcation of the boundary (art. 6), further cooperation (art. 7), and notification of the agreement to the United Nations (art. 8).

III. REQUEST BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHAD AND THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA FOR UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS

5. In letters dated 6 and 7 April 1994, respectively, the permanent representatives of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (S/1994/402) and Chad (S/1994/424) transmitted to me the agreement signed at Surt, on 4 April 1994 between their Governments concerning the practical modalities for the implementation of the ICJ Judgment.

6. I have taken note of article 1 of the agreement, which provides, inter alia, that (a) operations for the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and the forces shall commence on 15 April 1994, under the supervision of a mixed team composed of 25 Libyan and 25 Chadian officers, (b) the mixed team shall be based at the administrative post of Aouzou, (c) the withdrawal operation shall end on 30 May 1994 at 0000 hours and (d) United Nations observers shall be present during all the Libyan withdrawal operations and shall establish that the withdrawal is actually effected.

IV. RECONNAISSANCE MISSION TO CHAD AND THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

7. On receiving the letters of the Permanent Representatives of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad, the Secretariat established immediate contact with the permanent missions of the two countries. In the ensuing discussions, the two missions confirmed to the Secretariat that their Governments were prepared to accord the United Nations the fullest support in undertaking the tasks entrusted to it in article 1 of the agreement. Further, they agreed that a reconnaissance team composed of both civilian personnel and military observers would proceed to the area to conduct a brief survey of conditions on the ground and that the team

would have access to the entire territory of the Strip and would have complete freedom of movement within the territory.

8. On 13 April 1994, I informed the President of the Security Council (S/1994/432) of the transmittal to the United Nations of the Agreement signed by the two Governments and the understandings reached in consultations between the Secretariat and the Governments of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and also that the reconnaissance team would have to visit the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, whenever necessary, on a United Nations aircraft for discussions on the practical support the Libyan Government could provide to the team as well as to obtain goods and services that might be needed in support of the related United Nations activities.

9. On 14 April 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 910 (1994), by which it decided that paragraph 4 of its resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992 should not apply in respect of United Nations aircraft flying to and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the purpose of conveying the Secretary-General's reconnaissance team and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 (1992) of flights that had been made to and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

10. In addition to civilian personnel, the Reconnaissance Team included military observers drawn from United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The team was led by Colonel B. Mazlan of Malaysia. The team arrived in Tripoli, on 15 April, where it held meetings with the Libyan authorities on 16 April. It proceeded to the Aouzou Strip on 17 April, where it has been meeting with the Chadian and Libyan mixed team established to supervise the withdrawal process pursuant to article 1 of the agreement of 4 April 1994. The reconnaissance team has received the logistical support it needed from the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and both the Chadian and Libyan Governments have cooperated with the team in its work.

11. On the basis of the discussions the team had in Tripoli and in the Aouzou Strip and of a preliminary assessment of conditions on the ground, the team has reported that it would be possible to deploy United Nations observers to monitor the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces and to establish that the withdrawal has been actually effected in accordance with article 1 of the agreement of 4 April. To this end, the two Governments have been requested to provide the Secretariat with an agreed list of places from which the withdrawal is to take place.

V. PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS IN THE AOUZOU STRIP

12. The tasks described above could be carried out by a group of military observers to be known as the "United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)". These observers will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. UNASOG would be headed in the field by a Chief Military Observer designated by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Chief Military Observer would report to the Secretary-General. For his part the Secretary-General would report as necessary to the Security Council on the

operations of UNASOG. All matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the observers would be referred to the Security Council for its decision.

13. As regards the concept of operations, UNASOG would establish its headquarters at the Aouzou administrative post. It would have three sectors: one would be located at Bardai, a second would be located at Ounmo/Oumchi and the third sector would be located at Cazandou (see sketch map). It is estimated that, in order to carry out its monitoring functions, UNASOG would require nine military observers and six international civilian support staff. The military observers as well as most of the civilian support staff will be drawn from MINURSO.

14. In accordance with established practice, UNASOG would need to have freedom of movement, communication and inspection, and be accorded the facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks. UNASOG and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Should the Security Council decide to establish UNASOG, it would be my intention to initiate consultations with the Governments of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, with a view to concluding with each Government a status-of-mission agreement in accordance with established practice.

15. The financial implications of the operations described above are contained in the annex to the present report.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

16. On the basis of the conclusions of the reconnaissance team referred to above, I propose that the Security Council authorize the deployment of a group of United Nations observers in the Aouzou Strip for a period of approximately 40 days from the date of adoption of the relevant decision of the Council.

17. The reconnaissance team has also reported that the mixed (Chad/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) team has expressed its concerns about the welfare of approximately 4,000 inhabitants in the Aouzou Strip after the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces. These inhabitants have been dependent for their livelihood on the support the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been providing to them. In consultation with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, it is envisaged that a representative of the United Nations Development Programme could assist the team in assessing the potential humanitarian dimensions of the situation.

18. Subject to the approval of the Council, I envisage that UNASOG would be deployed immediately. The reconnaissance team with five military observers already in the area will become the advance party of the operation with the rest of the personnel to be deployed a few days later. Since, according to article 1 of the agreement of 4 April 1994, the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces was to begin on 15 April 1994, on which date the reconnaissance team arrived in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the reconnaissance team will continue to monitor the withdrawal until the Security Council establishes UNASOG.

19. A decision to deploy UNASOG would assist the parties in implementing the Judgment of ICJ concerning the territorial dispute between them and contribute to the promotion of peaceful and friendly relations between these two African countries.

20. I shall, of course, keep the Council informed and report on the completion of the task assigned to UNASOG.

Notes

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, No. 26801.

2/ Ibid., No. 27943.

Annex

United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group

Estimated requirements from 15 April to 30 May 1994

SUMMARY STATEMENT

(In thousands of United States dollars)

1.	Military observers costs	56.1
2.	Civilian personnel costs	57.5
3.	Premises	0.0
4.	Transport operations	26.3
5.	Air operations	93.6
6.	Communications	102.0
7.	Supplies and services	60.0
	Total estimated requirement	395.5



UNASOG DEPLOYMENT IN THE AOUZOU STRIP

▲ Sector locations

SKETCH-MAP No.4

Boundary Line determined by the Court's Judgment

NB: International boundaries indicated by pecked lines are shown for illustrative purposes only.

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